



Simple
models of
teens,
diplomats,
religious cults
and more

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group
formation

youth
subcultures

coevolution of
networks and
opinions

the diplomat's
dilemma

Simple models of teens, diplomats, religious cults and more

Petter Holme

KTH, CSC, Computational Biology

January 12, 2008, Is There a Physics of Society?, SFI

<http://www.csc.kth.se/~pholme/>



outline

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youth subcultures

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the diplomat's dilemma

simple mechanistic models of the micro- to macro-transition in networked social systems (toy models), of:

- group formation *w Andreas Grönlund*
- youth subcultures *w Andreas Grönlund*
- co-evolution of networks and opinions *w Mark Newman*
- agents maximizing centrality & minimizing degree *w Gourab Ghoshal*



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motivation

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- *macro phenomena*: subcultures & other distinct social groups in social networks
- *micro process*: search for personal identity
- *idea*: modify the “seceder model” [Dittrich *et al.*, Phys. Rev. Lett. **84** (2000), 3205–3208] to a network model



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the seceder model

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- N individuals with a real number $s(i)$ representing the traits of i
- Select three individuals i_1 , i_2 and i_3 randomly.
- Pick the one of these \hat{i} whose s -value is furthest from the average $[s(i_1) + s(i_2) + s(i_3)]/3$.
- Replace the s -value of a random agent j with $s(\hat{i}) + \eta$, where η is a random number from the normal distribution $N(0, 1)$.

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time evolution

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
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


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genotype



genotype



the networked seceder model

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- Select three random (but distinct) vertices i_1 , i_2 and i_3 .
- Pick the one of these with highest eccentricity \hat{i} (or, if the graph is disconnected, the member of the smallest group with highest eccentricity).
- Pick another random vertex j in $V \setminus \{\hat{i}\}$. Rewire as many of j 's edges as possible to \hat{i} .
- Go through all j 's edges once more and, with a probability p , rewire these to random others.

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
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
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
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
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
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output: example network



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
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output: time evolution



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output: parameter dependence

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

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summary

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- Grönlund & Holme, Phys. Rev. E **70**, 036108 (2004)
- group formation (the desired qualitative behavior) occurs
- turned an agent-based model of group formation into a network-evolution model
- the original model was simplified, by omitting the explicit trait variable



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- to start with documented principles and derive a model for the dynamics of youth subcultures
- turn these observations into a mechanistic model



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- S. Thornton. *Club Cultures: Music, Media and Subcultural Capital*. Polity Press, Cambridge UK, 1995.
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precepts

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- an adolescent belongs to one subculture at a time
- threshold behavior: if the fraction of friends that have adopted a certain subculture is big enough then an adolescent will adopt that subculture too
- the attractiveness of a subculture decreases with its age
- there is a certain resistance to changing subcultures
- the dynamics of the underlying social network is negligible



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attractiveness

$$s_c(t, i) = \frac{k}{k_i} n_i(c) \frac{t(c) - t(c_i)}{t - t(c_i)}$$

- where $t(c)$ is the age of c
- $k = 2M/N$ is the average degree
- k_i is the degree of i
- $n_i(c)$, the number of neighbors of i with the identity c

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- For every vertex i (chosen sequentially) calculate the score $s_c(t, i)$ of all subcultures c .
- Go through the vertex set sequentially once again. If the score is higher than a threshold T for some identity c , then i change its identity to c . If more than one subculture has a score above the threshold then the individual adopts the subculture with the highest score.
- With a probability R a new identity is assigned to a vertex. (On average, NR fads are introduced per time step.)

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output: parameter dependence

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



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
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P. Holme & M. E. J. Newman, Phys. Rev. E **74**, 056108 (2006).

- Opinions spread over social networks.
- People with the same opinion are likely to become acquainted.
- We try to combine these points into a simple model of simultaneous opinion spreading and network evolution.



the idea

P. Holme & M. E. J. Newman, Phys. Rev. E **74**, 056108 (2006).

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group formation

youth subcultures

coevolution of networks and opinions

the diplomat's dilemma



the idea

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
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Clifford & Sudbury, *Biometrika* **60**, 581 (1973).
Holley & Liggett, *Ann. Probab.* **3**, 643 (1975).

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
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choose one vertex randomly

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
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copy the opinion of a random neighbor

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
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
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
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
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acquaintance dynamics: precepts

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- People of similar interests are likely to get acquainted.
- The number of edges is constant.

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
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
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
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
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rewire an edge to a vertex w same opinion

acquaintance dynamics



and so on . . .

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
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
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
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
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low ϕ — one dominant cluster

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

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high ϕ —clusters of similar sizes



quantities we measure

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- The relative largest size S of a cluster (of vertices with the same opinion).
- The average time τ to reach consensus.



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
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cluster size distribution



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Assume a critical scaling form:

scaling form

$$S = N^{-a} F\left(N^b(\phi - \phi_c)\right)$$

finding the phase transition

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
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
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
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$a = 0.61 \pm 0.05$, $\phi_c = 0.458 \pm 0.008$, $b = 0.7 \pm 0.1$
 random graph percolation: $a = b = 1/3$

finding the phase transition



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
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

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dynamic critical behavior

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- coevolution of networks and opinions
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conclusions

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- We have proposed a simple, non-equilibrium model for the coevolution of networks and opinions.
- The model undergoes a second order phase transition between: One state of clusters of similar sizes. One state with one dominant cluster.
- The universality class is not the same as random graph percolation.
- In society, a tiny change in the social dynamics may cause a large change in the diversity of opinions.

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
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
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1. Be central in the information flow.

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
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- Central is good—*closeness centrality*

$$C(i) = (N - 1) / \sum_{j \neq i} d(i, j)$$

- If the network is disconnected, being a part of a large component is good.
- Large degree is bad.

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Component size can be incorporated by modifying the definition of closeness: If we sum the reciprocals (instead of inverting the sum), we get the score function:

Definition

$$s(i) = \begin{cases} (1/k_i) \sum_{H_i} 1/d(i,j) & \text{if } k_i > 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } k_i = 0 \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

H_i is the component i belongs to, except i

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- myopic agents . . . can use information, and add / delete edges, within the 2-neighborhood
- we also assume the score and degree of a vertex is known
- let the agents use a genetic algorithm to develop attachment / deletion strategies
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outline

Simple models of teens, diplomats, religious cults and more

PETTER HOLME

group formation

youth subcultures

coevolution of networks and opinions

the diplomat's dilemma

- myopic agents . . can use information, and add / delete edges, within the 2-neighborhood
- we also assume the score and degree of a vertex is known
- let the agents use a genetic algorithm to develop attachment / deletion strategies
- **drive the system with noise**

Simple models of teens, diplomats, religious cults and more


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
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effect of random moves: degree & cluster size



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- A simple problem that gets quite convoluted when one wants to be general.
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- Network structure and strategy densities are correlated.
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